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ABSTRACT
Over the last three years, the public debt markets in the real estate sector have a grown at
a rapid rate. As of June 1998, the Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities (CMBS)
market was providing the majority of take-out financing for construction loans for
commercial real estate. This dramatically changed in July 1998, when Russia defaulted on
it's government debt and investors withdrew their money from high-yield, high-risk
investments in favor of safer investments. This "flight to quality" caused lending within
the public real estate capital markets to come to a virtual standstill. While macro-economic
turmoil was the catalyst of the capital crisis, it brought fears regarding underwriting
practices to the surface.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly discuss the causes of the capital crisis of 1998 and
to analyze its impact on underwriting standards for construction loans. The primary
method of research for this paper, a survey of national construction lenders, was designed
to provide a snapshot of underwriting standards prior to the capital crisis, at the height of
the crisis, and today. These underwriting standards are contrasted against both property
market fundamentals and development activity at these various times.
The results of the survey confirm that there was a dislocation between the public capital
markets and property market fundamentals. While public capital markets are perceived to
increase real estate market efficiency in the long term, there is a cost associated with the
presence of the capital markets, namely increased volatility in the short term. As macro-
economic shocks occur to the capital markets, property markets will be similarly affected.
As evidenced by the capital crunch of August 1998, the role of construction lenders has
become more dynamic. Henceforth, construction lenders will have to quickly adjust
underwriting standards to reflect the ever-changing risk characteristics present in the
capital markets. The question remains: Will the long-term efficiencies gained by the
presence of the public markets outweigh the short-term cost of increase volatility? The
answer will largely depend on the ability of construction lenders to monitor the capital
markets and price loans accordingly.
Thesis Supervisor: Blake Eagle
Title: Chairman, Center for Real Estate
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Format
This thesis traces the evolution of commercial real estate construction lending in light of
the capital market crisis of August 1998. It is intended to outline trends in construction
lending since January 1998. In Chapter 2, general information on construction lending is
provided. Traditional sources and risk of construction loans are outlined. Chapter 3
discusses our research methodology. Chapters 4 through 6 assess the construction lending
market in the United States at three points in time, immediately before the capital crunch,
during the capital crunch, and today (June 1999). These Chapters address the availability
of take-out financing, underwriting standards, interest rates on construction loans,
property market fundamentals, and development activity at each specified point in time.
Chapter 5 also addresses the macroeconomic factors that contributed to the capital crunch
of August 1998 and the immediate reaction of capital markets. Chapter 7 concludes with
an assessment of the relation between capital markets and its future impact on
construction lending.
1.2. Capital Markets Overview
The purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to various types of institutions
involved in the capital markets. This introduction is not intended to be comprehensive,
but instead is intended to provide background information so the reader can better
understand issues presented in this thesis.
Conduits
In the 1990's, the commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) sector was one of the
fastest growing capital markets. Although this market was virtually non-existent at the
beginning of the decade, it quickly grew to a multi-billion dollar industry. The growth of
the CMBS market came about as a result of the distressed commercial real estate market
in the early 1990's and the retrenchment of traditional lenders, such as tax shelter
syndicates, commercial banks, life insurance companies, and thrift institutions. Borrowers
and portfolio sellers turned to the capital markets to raise funds by issuing CMBS. The
capital markets (coduits) serve as intermediaries, underwriting loans and structuring them
into securities designed to appeal to investors who might not otherwise become involved
in the commercial property market. These securities are backed by various types of
collateral, including office, multi-family, retail, industrial and hotel properties.
Conduits, which are often investment banks, assume a highly leveraged position. In
general, conduits take a 10% equity position, while borrowing the remaining 90% from
large institutions, such as large commercial banks.' With these funds, they underwrite
loans which are pooled together to originate commercial backed securities. In fact, the
distinguishing characteristic of these securities is that they are typically a collection of
individual assets which cash flows are aggregated, or pooled together. As a result of
borrowing on a short-term basis from commercial banks in order to fund mortgages with
long-term durations, conduits are exposed to interest rate risk while the loans are pooled
' It is ironic that the funds which are borrowed from commercial banks serve as the capital by which
conduits are enabled to directly compete with these same lenders.
in preparation for securitization. Interest rate fluctuations during this warehousing period
can result in substantial losses or gains to the conduit.
"The general economic principal driving securitization (and financial engineering in
general) is that the value of the sum of the parts exceeds the value of the whole." 2
Conduits create value by partitioning pooled cash flows according to exposure to default
risk. Since default risk affects the timing and receipt of commercial mortgage cash flows,
most CMBS structures are designed to shift default-risk down through the various
security classes. "This is typically accomplished by prioritizing return of total pool
principal payments, where 'senior' traunches have priority on principal that is returned
through loan amortization or default/foreclosure recoveries. Lower priority traunches
must wait until senior classes are fully repaid before they are eligible for return of
principle. Moreover, although principal is allocated 'top-down', losses resulting from
default/foreclosure realizations are allocated 'bottom-up', which means that the face value
of the lowest-rated traunches decline by the realized default loss."3 This process yields
securities with very diverse risk characteristics. Senior traunches can be virtually risk-free,
while junior traunches can be very risky.
Hedge Funds
Hedge funds come in many different forms and their strategies vary widely. Some hedge
funds specialize in making money from particular expected events, such as mergers or
2 Timothy Riddiough, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities: A Primer, Mimeo, 1996.
' Id.
bankruptcies, or simply play the stock market. Other hedge funds, the macro funds, take a
general directional view, betting on a particular bond market or currency movement.
Many of these funds invest in low rated CMBS, in addition to mortgage REITs. "Such
funds try to exploit perceived anomalies in the price of different bonds by buying under-
priced ones and selling short over-priced ones. No matter what happens to the overall
interest rates, as long as the spreads between the two narrows, the fund makes money."4
The fund can, however, lose substantial amounts of money if the markets perception about
the likelihood of default changes dramatically and the spreads widen.
Mortgage REITs
Mortgage REITs raise equity and debt capital through public markets and employ short-
term sources of credit to fund asset ownership. The assets of mortgage REITs are
typically low-rated CMBS and similar high-risk debt securities. In fact, mortgage REITs
are the biggest purchasers of low-rated CMBS securities. These assets are exposed to
both high interest rate risk and default risk given the low subordination level of the
underlying CMBS position. These assets are highly illiquid and have medium term
durations. The liabilities of a mortgage REIT are priced daily in relatively efficient
markets. Give this capital structure, mortgage REITs do not have a market neutral
asset/liability base. Fluctuations in interest rates can cause severe problems for mortgage
REITs.
4 Anonymous, Hedge Funds: A Guide, The Economist, October 3, 1998.
Commercial Banks
Given their capital structure (short-term liabilities in the form of deposits), commercial
banks have an incentive to underwrite short-term loans in order to guard against the risks
associated with interest rate fluctuations. Additionally, commercial banks usually have a
local presence in the markets that they service. This allows them to closely monitor
outstanding loans. Accordingly, commercial banks provide the large majority of
construction loans and have not become significantly involved in the permanent financing
market.
In order to retain their customer base, banks often provide the most favorable
underwriting standards on construction loans. Many banks are also attempting to enhance
their product line by offering a variety of debt and equity services in order to maintain
their competitive advantage and to retain customers. Many commercial banks are now
providing a wide array of financing alternatives, including bridge financing and mezzanine
debt. It is somewhat ironic that banks are also now providing financing to many of the
institutions that compete for permanent financing, including conduits and REITs.
Insurance Companies
Insurance companies have been the traditional providers of permanent financing for
commercial real estate. Investment in long-term assets, such as commercial mortgages,
has however become less attractive recently because customer preferences have changed
from long-term whole life policies to term insurance. By directly investing in real estate (a
long-term asset) and providing term insurance (a medium duration liability), insurance
companies are increasingly becoming exposed to interest rate risk. Additionally, in
reaction to past losses, insurance regulators have significantly increased risk based capital
requirements for direct investment in real estate.' Despite the dramatic change in their
capital structure and capital requirements, insurance companies have remained one of the
major providers of permanent financing in the 1990s.
5 Bowen McCoy, Real Estate Capital Markets: A New Paradigm?, Real Estate Issues, December 1997
CHAPTER 2
CONSTRUCTION LENDING - TRADITIONAL
SOURCES AND RISKS
2.1. Sources of Capital for Construction
Commercial Banks are the traditional source of construction loans. They account for
approximately 85% of all construction loans.6 However, since the peak of the last real
estate cycle, the commercial banking industry has undergone significant change. To attain
efficiencies in operations, these and other lending institutions have consolidated over the
last decade.' This consolidation has decreased competition and limited access to capital.
For example, the number of banks that make construction loans in excess of $10,000,000
in Massachusetts has decreased from 15 to 4 banks.8 Consolidation within the
commercial banking industry over the last decade has reduced competition and has most
likely resulted in higher underwriting standards in general. With fewer banks competing
for construction loans, lenders can be more selective, financing developers with
established track records and sound reputations.9
6 Interview with Peter Goedecke, Goedecke & Company, April 1999.
7 Bowen McCoy, Tragedy of the Commons: Will It Be Different This Time?, Real Estate Issues, Summer
1998.
8 Interview with George Fantini, Fantini & Gorga, April 1999.
The consolidation that has occurred within the commercial banking industry over the last
decade has apparently caused a relative tightening of underwriting standards for
construction loans. With this background in mind, we will discuss the general risks
associated with construction lending and analyze the impact of market events since
January 1998 on the construction lending industry.
2.2. Risks in Construction Lending
There are essentially two traditional risks associated with construction lending; the risk of
non-completion and the risk that the project will not be economically viable upon
completion.10 First, the construction lender may advance funds that are insufficient to
complete the development. The risk of non-completion is extremely high for construction
lenders not only because of the numerous events that may lead to non-completion, but also
because of the severity of the loss sustained in the event of non-completion. If the project
is not completed, the construction lender may be left with an outstanding loan that far
exceeds the value of existing collateral.
Funds advanced by the construction lender may be insufficient to complete the project for
a number of reasons, including inaccurate cost estimates, failure of a contractor or sub-
contractor to perform, unavailability of materials, destruction of property, and unrelated
financial problems of the developer. Lenders can reduce many of these risks by
undertaking the following precautions:
9 Interview with George Fantini, Fantini & Gorga, April 1999.
Obtain Independent Cost Estimates - Lenders can overcome the risk of
underestimating costs by obtaining independent estimates of construction costs,
including hard costs, soft costs, and start-up costs associated with the project.
Construction lenders should also assume and factor in the likelihood of cost overruns
during the course of the development.
Secure a Loan Guarantee - It is essential that the lender obtain a construction loan
guarantee from the developer or someone with a substantial net worth. The lender
should review the financial statements of the guarantor prior to making the loan and
periodically during the construction process. This review must include an analysis of
all other obligations the guarantor has outstanding. Additional advances should be
conditioned upon the guarantor having a net worth that significantly exceeds the
aggregate obligations.
Make Periodic Progress Payments - Draws from the construction loan should
always be based upon an architect's certification that work is acceptable and should
include a holdback of at least 10%. The periodic release of funds enables the lender
to monitor costs and quickly identify problems. The holdback provides the contractor
with an incentive to complete the project at the required standard, in order to be
eligible to receive the outstanding 10% of the construction contract amount.
10 Stuart M. Saft, Reducing the Risks of Construction Lending, The Real Estate Finance Journal, Spring
1999.
Obtain a Completion Guarantee and Performance Bond - The lender should
ensure that the developer obtains and maintains performance bonds and payment
bonds. Performance bonds provide assurance that the project will be completed.
Payment bonds provide the lender with the comfort of knowing that mechanics liens
will not be filed against the project because the insurer is obliged to pay
subcontractors, suppliers and laborers who are not paid by the contractor.
Obtain Insurance Coverage - The lender should insist that the developer maintain
an all risk builder's policy that will provide funds to reimburse the lender if the
project is fully or partially destroyed by a fire or other casualty. The developer
should also be required to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance and
workers compensation insurance. The lender should insist on receiving a copy of the
policy and not just a certificate of issuance.
Assignments - The lender should ensure that they have received an assignment of
each of the construction contracts. It is essential that developers, contractors,
professionals and suppliers acknowledge the lender's interests in the agreement and
agree to recognize the lender in the event that the developer defaults. This ensures
that the lender will able to assume control of the contracts to complete the
development if the developer defaults.
Despite these precautions, construction lenders ultimately bear the risk that the project will not
be economically viable upon completion. There are two central reasons that a project may not
be economically viable upon completion. The first reason is linked to the property market in
which the projected is being constructed. Upon completion the project may not be able to
achieve rents sufficient to cover costs, including operating expenses and debt service." This
may occur if construction costs are underestimated or, more likely, because market conditions
(rents) have changed since the project's inception. During construction, anticipated markets
rents for a particular project may fall for a myriad of economic reasons, the most simple of
which are increased supply and/or diminished demand. Accordingly, the availability and pricing
of construction loans will always be tied to the property market. During real-estate booms,
underwriting standards are typically relaxed and the opposite holds true during busts.
The second reason that a project may not be economically viable upon completion is
linked to the capital markets. Construction lenders occasionally advance funds without
permanent financing in place. When a lender makes a construction loan without a permanent
loan commitment, the construction lender could be left with a completed project and have no
way of liquidating its loan. Permanent financing may not be available for several reasons that
are unrelated to the underlying property markets, as discussed above. Due to fluctuations in or
shocks to the capital markets, permanent lenders may completely stop all loan activity.
Alternatively, the interest rates or other terms offered by permanent lenders may be so onerous
"1 Most permanent lenders condition their loans on a project being economically viable. This is generally
assessed by way of a minimum debt-service coverage ratio. If minimum requirements are not met,
permanent lenders may rescind. Accordingly, the construction lender is at risk if the developer cannot
secure alternative permanent financing.
that the property cannot support them. The unavailability or limited access to take-out
financing can dramatically influence construction lender's willingness to commit funds to
development projects due to the perceived risks involved.
The market events that have occurred since January 1998 have primarily influenced the
availability of take-out financing. Construction lenders have responded to this increased risk by
adjusting spreads and underwriting standards. Accordingly, this will be the focus of our
analysis.
CHAPTER 3
SUR VEYMETHODOLOGYAND RESULTS
The primary method of research for this paper was based upon a survey of the largest
construction lenders within the United States. The survey was designed to accurately
reflect changes in construction lending practices by assessing underwriting standards at
three points in time; immediately prior to the capital crunch, during the capital crunch, and
as of June 1999. The survey (a copy is contained in Appendix 1) attempted to identify
changes in the following areas as a result of the capital crisis:
> Changes in Loan to Value Ratios (LTV);
> Construction loan spreads over LIBOR;
> Pre-leasing requirements for construction loans;
> Providers of take-out financing;
> Percent of permanent lenders issuing forward commitments.
The survey was also designed to assess lender's opinions of property market fundamentals
during the crisis. These opinions were considered useful in trying to establish whether or
not the capital crisis reflected property market fundamentals.
In selecting construction lenders to whom the survey would be sent we attempted to
identify the largest construction lenders in the United States. These companies were
identified by referencing Fleets Guide, "Income Property Debt and Equity Sourcebook",
(Spring/Summer 1997). Fleets Guide is an independent directory of all lenders in the
United States and specifies the geographical areas in which they lend, the average loan
size, the total volume of loans over the last two years, the types of loans originated, in
addition to other information.
All lenders that undertook various types of construction loans were identified (i.e.
construction with pre-leasing, construction with/without take-out financing, construction
loans with/without guarantees). To ensure that a geographical balance of lenders was
represented in our results, we generated a sample of geographically differentiated banks.
We also surveyed lenders that originated loans throughout the United States.
In addition to construction lenders identified from Fleets Guide we also contacted all MIT
Center for Real Estate Alumni's that were currently employed with companies that
originated construction loans. This was done in the belief that the Alumni would be more
likely to complete the survey (a very high percentage of Alumni did respond to the
survey).
For data collection purposes all lenders were first contacted by telephone and the person
who was most qualified to complete the survey was identified. We then attempted to
speak to each relevant person and to provide them with a brief outline of our topic of
research and to ask them for their cooperation in completing our survey. A voice mail
massage was left in instances when we could not directly speak to the person. We then
prepared a fax cover sheet on the MIT letterhead in an attempt to increase the likelihood
of completion of the survey. The fax cover sheet gave a brief outline of our topic of
research and also our phone numbers in the event that they had any questions.
Recognizing the fact that respondents would have limited time to complete the survey we
realized that it had to be brief and easy to follow. With this in mind, we designed the
survey with the intent of covering all relevant issues in a direct and succinct manner. The
questionnaire was contained on two pages and included space for respondents to state
their name, title and company. Given the above, the survey included a one page cover
page and a two page questionnaire.
Many of the individuals contacted responded immediately. However, others required
several follow-up calls in order to ensure that they did respond. Several of the companies
contacted stated that they considered the information requested to be proprietary and
therefore were, unwilling to complete the survey. However, many of these people did
provide verbal opinions as to the impact of the capital crisis and some of these are
contained within this paper. Of the 80 surveys that were sent, 21 responses were received.
CHAPTER 4
CONSTRUCTION LENDING PRIOR TO THE CRUNCH
4.1 Take-Out Financing Prior to Capital Crunch
In the late 80's and early 90's, commercial banks and insurance companies provided the
vast majority of take-out financing for construction loans. A decade later, prior to the
capital crunch, conduits successfully captured a substantial market share in the commercial
real estate take-out financing arena 2 . Conduits are lenders that originate loans with the
specific intent of placing them into an asset pool for securitization. Through traunching,
or separating the loan into various subordinated parts, conduits can effectively market
these securities to a wide variety of investors according to their risk/return preferences.
Recent market share growth and competitive pricing reflect the efficiency gains associated
with the conduit program production process." Over the previous three years, conduits
lending had steadily increased their market share. In 1997, conduits issued approximately
50% of all permanent financing for commercial real estate, up from 34% in 1996, and 25%
14in 1995
Survey results indicate that as of July 1998 conduits originated 55% of take-out financing,
insurance companies originated 30%, and commercial banks 15%". As of August 1998,
12 Jane Adler, It's Where the Money Is, Journal of Property Management, 63(5), September 1, 1998.
" Tim Riddiough, Real Estate Capital Markets, Lecture Notes, MIT, Spring 1999.
14 Joe Rubin & Phoebe Moreo, CMBS: Crossing the Bridge, Mortgage Bankers Association of America,
July 1998.
15 Survey Results, June 1999.
the volume of CMBS securitization had reached approximately $50 billion and there was
$30 billion in the pipeline. The advent of CMBS in the commercial financing market led
to increased competition. Many new conduits were created. "Commercial banks and
investment banks vied with one another to control market share, and even some life
insurers formed conduits to grab a piece of the action."16  As a result of increased
competition among lenders, borrowers were able to pressure conduits to lower rates,
increase leverage and ease mortgage covenants. As a result, the spreads over Treasuries
for permanent financing tightened and capital for construction was available at a relatively
low cost. "Getting a loan [was] so easy, compared to a few years ago, it [was] the next
best thing to bank robbery." 7
4.2 Underwriting Standards Prior to the Capital Crunch
Since early 1996, the percentage of FDIC-insured banks that frequently issued speculative
construction loans, loans with no pre-leasing, had steadily increased (based on a large
sample averaging around 1,000 institutions nation-wide). The ratio reached its peak in
March 1998 at 31%.'8 Similarly, other aspects of underwriting standards had
progressively become more relaxed; the number of speculative developments financed, the
deferral of interest payments during loan durations, the absence of alternative repayment
sources, and the failure to verify the reliability of alternative repayment sources had all
16 Joe Rubin & Phoebe Moreo, CMBS: Crossing the Bridge, Mortgage Bankers Association of America,
July 1998..
17 Jane Adler, Real Estate: It's Where the Money Is, Journal of Property Management, September 1, 1998.
18 FDIC: Report on Underwriting Practices, September 1998.
increased 19. For example, according to an FDIC Report on Underwriting Standards for
the 6 month period prior to the capital crunch, 23% of FDIC insured banks made
construction loans without considering sources of repayment other than the project being
financed, up from 19% reported for the previous six month period.
In addition, underwriting practices were increasingly relaxed for commercial real estate
take-out financing. According to a National Real Estate Investor's article, many
commercial loans were provided with virtually no cushion against NOI fluctuations (Debt
Service Coverage Ratio of 1 to 1) and LTV's up to 100 percent were awarded to non-
investment grade tenants.20
Immediately prior to the capital crunch, competition between construction lenders resulted
in a relaxation of underwriting standards. Survey results indicate that, prior to August
1998, for investment grade projects, the average LTV ratio was 80%, the average equity
contribution was 15%, the average mezzanine financing was 5%, and the average spread
21
over LIBOR was 160 basis points.
Observing high LTV ratios and substantial lending to non-investment grade developments,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued several warnings of "potential
problems in construction and commercial real-estate lending." In the words of FDIC
Chairman Andrew Hove, "currently there's no cause for alarm, but ... certain underwriting
19 FDIC: Report on Underwriting Practices, September 1998.20 Richard DiBernardo, The Last Word, National Real Estate Investor, December 1998.
practices, especially involving construction and commercial real estate loans, should
continue to be monitored carefully".
4.3 Property Market Fundamentals & Development Prior to the Capital Crunch
The U.S. has benefited from strong economic growth and generally favorable real estate
markets since the early 1990"s. Driven by a recovering economy and the large-scale
acquisition strategy pursued by REITs, property values have been steadily rising for the
past six years. REIT's lower cost of capital enabled them to bid up the prices of
properties. In 1997, REITs accounted for 50% of all acquisitions of investment grade
commercial property.
Due to the perception that REIT managers were overpaying for assets and the potential
for overbuilding, REIT share-prices declined after January 1998. While an imminent real
estate downturn was not predicted, concerns were raised regarding the substantial growth
in real estate development and the related increase in construction loans in some markets.
In fact, the rate of growth of newly issued building permits by early 1998, if projected
forward on a straight-line basis, would have clearly created oversupply. The market
reacted "to the presence of cranes"24 or, more accurately, to the emergence of the
developers. "REIT share decline was partly in line with the broad stock market decline,
but also because of a perception that too much development may be taking place on a
21 Survey Results, June 1999.
2 2 Anonymous, FDIC Report Provides Early Warning of Potential Problems in Construction and
Commercial Real Estate Lending, Press Release, November 24, 1997.
23 Geoffrey Richards, Passing Cold Front for Developers, Shopping Center World, December 1998.
national scale."2  By the second half of 1998, REITs were in a period of contraction in
terms of acquisitions. This partially averted the concerns of overbuilding. Perhaps for the
first time, the capital markets had brought meaningful discipline to the real estate industry.
According to Torto Wheaton Reseach,26 construction of office space had more than
quadrupled between the last quarter of 1992 and the last quarter of 1997, and jumped by
almost 50 percent between mid-1997 and mid-1998. Despite this growth, the new stock
represented less than 50% of the volume that occurred during the boom of the 1980's.
By year-end 1997, office vacancy was running at only 10.5 percent nationally and many
markets had shown double-digit increase in rent levels." These numbers reflected a
continued imbalance between supply and demand. Net absorption was approximately 70
million square feet for the year, while new supply was estimated at 30 million square feet
for the year.
By July 1998, excess supply was at its lowest, 12 percent, since the late 1980's, according
to FDIC survey results. 28 Furthermore, 24 percent of the FDIC respondents characterized
supply conditions in their local commercial markets as "tight", the highest proportion since
the survey's inception in 1991. FDIC survey results also indicate that sales prices for
24 Marilyn Evans, Next Stop - The Millennium, Journal of Property Management, January 1, 1999.
25 Dale Ann Reiss, Capital Markets Turmoil Suggests Caution for New York Real Estate", Real Estate
Weekly, Third Quarter Review, October 7, 1998.
26 CB Commercial /Torto Wheaton Research.
27 CB Commercial/Toro Wheaton Research, The Office Market Pendulum.
28 FDIC Survey of Real Estate Trends, Results of the July 1998 Survey (summarizing the results of 299
federal bank and thrift agency senior examiners and asset managers).
commercial properties had also increased significantly since 1997.29 Despite the
aggressive acquisitions made by REITs in 1997, property market fundamentals were
strong prior to the capital crunch of August of 1998. The commercial real estate
development environment was growing steadily, fueled by strong absorption, low vacancy
rates and low unemployment.
29 FDIC Survey of Real Estate Trends, Results of the July 1998 Survey (summarizing the results of 299
federal bank and thrift agency senior examiners and asset managers).
CHAPTER 5
THE IMPACT OF THE CAPITAL CRUNCH
ON CONSTRUCTION LENDING
5.1 The Capital Crunch
Global economic problems, culminating in Russia's announcement on August 17 that it
would default on its debt obligations, dramatically increased volatility in global capital
markets. As a result of the global economic turmoil, global hedge funds incurred
substantial losses and, in need of liquidity, were forced to sell their large equity positions
in mortgage REITs.
Investment banks also required liquidity and they were ready to call in their short-term
lines of credit extended to mortgage REITs. According to one mortgage REIT asset
manager, most of the problems face by mortgage REITs stemmed from a fear that their
credit lines would be called. "Because of this fear, and the markets unfavorable view of
mortgage REITs, we were unable/unwilling to invest more capital in CMBS."30 Since
mortgage REITs have traditionally been the largest purchasers of low-rated CMBS,
mortgage REIT's withdrawal from the market significantly contributed to the illiquidity of
the CMBS market. "Without the mortgage REITs, the CMBS market cannot compete
30 Survey Results, June 1999 (Derek Johnson, Senior Asset Manager, Ocwen Financial Corporation).
with whole loan providers. This results in increasing debt costs and in the case of financing
new development, development plans may be delayed or scrapped altogether." 31
In response to market volatility, risk-averse investors pulled out of high-yield, high-risk
investments. In search of safe investments, investors made a "flight to quality."32 Many
investors moved to Treasury Bills. Demand for Treasury Bills increased exponentially,
driving its yield down. The yield on ten-year Treasuries, against which CMBSs are
benchmarked, fell to 4.8 percent, 80 basis points lower than rates recorded only two
months earlier. The market was flooded with high-yield, high-risk investment. As a
result, liquidity in the CMBS market virtually disappeared. The lack of CMBS buyers
increased the spread of CMBS over Treasuries dramatically. When combined with the
lowered yield on Treasuries, CMBS reached unprecedented spreads.3 3
News from Russia immediately triggered a disruption in the CMBS market.3 While
macro-economic turmoil was the catalyst of the capital crisis, it brought many real estate
fears to the surface. Investors shifted their money out of the CMBS markets as a direct
result of their concerns over collateral and loan underwriting quality.
The sales of CMBS by hedge funds led to increased volatility in the CMBS market.
According to an October 1998 issue of Investment Property, spreads on AAA securities
31 Tim Riddiough, Real Estate Capital Markets, Lecture Notes, MIT, Spring 1999.
32 Jun Han, The Next Millennium Will Be Different, Mortgage Banking, February 1, 1999.
33 Id.
jumped from 85 basis points in July to 130 basis points in late September, while spreads
on BBB securities rose from 150 to 215 basis points. As pricing deteriorated, buyers
continued to leave the market and CMBS became more illiquid. "The debt market started
a panic of sorts, even though there weren't any obvious problems with the real estate
market in the United States".15 As a result, the pendulum had swung from favoring
borrowers to the lenders.
5.2. Change in Sources of Take-Out Financing
Reduced Competition: Conduits Withdraw
Through the securitization process, conduits are immediately linked to the capital markets.
Unlike insurance companies, conduits do not hold loans on a long-term basis. Fluctuations
in interest rates during the warehousing period can substantially affect profitability.
Accordingly, when the market became volatile in August of 1998. The increase in the
spreads made loans closed before the crunch unprofitable. 36 Conduits lost huge amounts
of money on warehoused loans
Due to a dramatic reduction in the number of purchasers of CMBS securities, conduits
with large inventories of loans were faced with two damaging solutions: hold the
inventory with the risk of increased losses, or dispose of the inventory as whole loans to
minimize losses. For example, WMF (a conduit) incurred a $30 million pre-tax loss when
34 Sally Gordon, A Lesson From the Capital Markets, Mortgage Bankers Association of America,
February 1, 1999.
* Geoffrey Richards, Passing Front for Developers", Shopping Center World, December 1998.
it sold whole loans amounting to $900 million to Merrill Lynch 37. The conduit most
negatively impacted by the crisis was Capital America, which had a $6 billion inventory of
warehoused loans.3 8
Two of the largest players completely stopped lending. First Boston Credit Suisse halted
its lending operations despite a $8 billion origination record in the first half of 1998.3 In
addition, Lehman Brothers, the leading CMBS issuer, was reported to have stopped
lending.40 As of late August, many conduits re-negotiated and increased spreads on deals
that were settled, in striking contrast with insurance companies which closed the deals
unchanged.
Following the capital crunch, interest rates offered by conduits ranged between 7 and
7.75%, while rates offered by insurance companies averaged between 6.75 and 7.25%.41
Conduits had lost their competitive edge; they had been priced out of the market. Many
borrowers opted out of the conduits that remained in business in the last quarter of 1998.
Accordingly, conduits either stopped lending or increased rates to unreasonable levels:
both scenarios resulted in conduits' withdrawal from the market.
36 Steve Bergsman, After the Fall: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Mortgage Banking, 59(2),
November 1998.
* Id.
38 Id.
39 Anonymous, First Boston Suddenly Halts Lending Spree, Commercial Mortgage Alert, September 14,
1998.
40 Steve Bergsman, After the Fall: Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Mortgage Banking, 59(2),
November 1998.
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Emergence of old players: Insurance Companies
As a result of conduits entering a temporary withdrawal phase, traditional commercial
lenders were able to regain market share. The stability of property markets encouraged
older players, with less captivity to the capital markets, to step in and fill the void. Mr.
Brian Sopp, Executive Vice President of US Trust Corp stated that "The major impact of
the capital crunch was a shift from Wall Street (conduits) to direct lenders (banks and
insurance companies)."42
After August 1998, life insurance companies reclaimed market share that had been lost to
conduits in recent years. Unlike conduits, life insurance companies have capacity to
41 Survey Results, June 1999.
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warehouse loans for long periods of time and are, therefore, less affected by short-term
capital market volatility. Life insurance companies can either originate whole loan
mortgages for their own portfolio or securitize loans for third parties 3 . Through their
ability to hold loans for extended periods, life insurance companies were able to do
business during the capital crunch. Insurance companies that had issued loans for
securitization, such as John Hancock, bought them back to hold them in their portfolio44.
Right after the crisis, insurance companies first followed the conduit market and increased
spreads. Ultimately, life insurance companies lowered rates slightly and regained market
share. By September 1998, insurance companies were providing 55% of the permanent
financing in the market, while conduits market share dropped from 55% to 5% . The
market share held by commercial banks also increased, from 15% to 40%. "With conduits
gone, life insurance companies returned with some banks".46 Graph 2 illustrates the
market share for commercial loan originators as of July 1998, and September 1998.
Graph 2
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5.3 Underwriting Standards in the Aftermath of the Capital Crunch
The reduction of sources of take-out financing, whether in the form of temporary
withdrawal of lenders from the market or excessively inflated spreads, has been the most
significant factor that has affected construction lending. The lack of competition in the
take-out financing market brought concerns of underwriting standards and over-building
to the surface. This lead existing construction lenders to impose more stringent
underwriting standards. As a result, speculative construction lending declined
substantially and development activity slowed down. For example, 40% of the planned
office development in Boston was put on hold.
Immediately after the conduit's withdrawal, rates increased excessively because of
insurance companies' relatively low volume of activity. Insurance companies and other
providers took the opportunity to provide whole loans at record high spreads, with
conservative underwriting terms. Many of them set floor rates averaging 7%.47 Only
investment grade developments with pre-leasing commitments from A-rated tenants were
underwritten. As insurance companies increased volume, take-out financing became more
readily available and construction lenders adjusted rates and underwriting standards to
more accurately reflect the risks involved in development.
Loan-to- Value Ratios
A survey undertaken by the Boston based mortgage broker firm of Fantini & Gorga
indicated that underwriting standards for construction loans had not reached pre-August
levels as of the last quarter of 199848 Prior to the capital crunch lenders were prepared to
commit to loans representing 80% of construction costs. This maximum Loan to Value
Ratio (LVR) reduced to 70% at the height of the capital crunch (September).49
Construction Loan spreads over LIBOR
Spreads over LIBOR for construction loans have been dramatically affected by the capital
crunch of last fall. Prior to the crunch, spreads were approximately 160 basis points. At
the height of the capital crunch, spreads increased to 240 basis points."
Pre-leasing requirement for Construction Loans
The capital crunch resulted in construction lenders requiring greater levels of pre-leasing
prior to committing to a construction loan. Prior to the capital crunch many lenders were
willing to finance developments in which none of the space pre-leased. The FDIC Report
on Underwriting Standards reported that 30% of FDIC insured banks issued speculative
loans with no pre-leasing in the six-month period prior to the capital crunch.5' The
average pre-leasing requirement increased to 50% in September 1998. "The capital crunch
brought speculative lending to a halt. Construction lending now requires enough pre-
leasing such that the leasing covers debt service at 1.00x with very few exceptions".5 2
47 John Levy, Financing Today, National Real Estate Investor, December 1998.
48 Fantini & Gorga, Rate Term and Letter, First Quarter 1999.
49 Survey Results, June 1999.
50 Id.
51 FDIC, Report on Underwriting Standards, September 1998.
52 Survey Results, June 1999 (Paul Nassar, Senior Vice President, Fleet Bank).
Percent of Loans with Forward Commitments
Some construction lenders require the developer to secure permanent financing prior to
committing the construction loan. The capital crunch resulted in a temporary change in the
percentage of lenders requiring forward commitments. Prior to the capital crunch only
10% of construction lenders required forward commitments. This percent increased to
20% at the height of the crunch.
Percent of Permanent Lenders Issuing Forward Commitments
As the capital crunch evolved, permanent lenders became hesitant to issue forward
commitments due to the perceived risks involved. It is interesting to note that prior to the
capital crunch, 85% of insurance companies were prepared to issue forward commitments.
At the height of the capital crunch (September 1998), this percent dropped to 50%.
Additionally, all other lenders reduced their willingness to make forward commitments. *
This illustrated in Graph 3.
Graph 3
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5.4 Property Market Fundamentals and Development
The turmoil of the capital crisis happened when real estate fundamentals were strong. "In
the year ending September 30, 1998, the NCREIF (National Council of Real Estate
Fiduciaries) Property Index registered a 17.3% return, the highest since 1981 ". This high
rate of return is considered to reflect the strength of the property market at the time of the
capital crisis. These high levels of return were accompanied by very low commercial
delinquency rates. In the third quarter of 1998, the delinquency rate of commercial
mortgages held by member companies of the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI)
declined to 0.57%, the lowest in decades."
It is widely accepted that the capital crunch can largely be attributed to the capital markets
rather than real estate fundamentals. "The dislocation of the capital markets had little to
do with real estate and much more to do with international factors such as the collapse of
the Russian markets and the spreading economic contagion in places such as Asia and
Latin America." 6 This opinion is supported by Stan Ross, vice chairman of E&Y
Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate, who stated at a ULI conference in November: "For once,
it not real estate's fault, but we still get blamed."5 7
5 Survey Results, June 1999.
54 Jun Han, The Next Millennium Will Be Different, Mortgage Banking, February 1, 1999.
5 Id
56 Steve Bergsman, US Forecast, National Real Estate Investor, November 1998
"7 Mariwyn Evans, Next Stop - The Millennium; Prospects of the Real Estate Industry, Journal of
Property Management, January 1, 1999.
The lack of competition among lenders and the increased loan pricing that resulted from
the capital crunch negatively affected several developments. Indeed, one of the most
severe negative impacts of the capital crunch on construction lending has been the inability
of many development projects to secure permanent financing. Without permanent
financing readily available, construction lenders were forced to increase spreads to
compensate for the risks associated with having to hold a loan permanently.
The capital crunch also resulted in the exodus of mezzanine financing and high leverage
bridge debt.18 Mezzanine financing is often used by developers to provide sufficient
capital for developments to proceed and increases the Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio. Mr.
George Fantini, of Boston-based Fantini and Gorga, reiterated this viewpoint stating that
"the capital crunch has resulted in this form of financing disappearing." Accordingly,
immediately after the crunch, developers were forced to put more equity capital into their
development projects, which resulted in reduced development activity.
Figures obtained from F.W. Dodge (Graph 4) indicate that a relatively low number of
projects were commenced during the three months (July - September) when the capital
crisis was at it's worst. This could be attributed to the high cost of debt and the
burdensome underwriting standards that occurred at the height of the crunch. "The capital
58 Oma Shulman, Despite Credit Crunch, Demand Continues in 1999, Real Estate Weekly, 45(26),
January 27, 1999.
crunch eliminated financing ability on one project for approximately 90 days - spreads
were extremly wide."' 9 "The capital crisis postponed several construction projects". 60
Graph 4
Source: F.W. Dodge
As the effects of the capital crisis abated, the level of starts dramatically increased in the
month of November. Since November 1998, there has been a decline in starts that can be
attributed to the more stringent underwriting standards that have ensued since the capital
crunch.
59Survey Results, June 1999 (Adam Meinstein, Geometry Realty Inc.).
* Survey Results, June 1999 (W. Burnham, Vice President, Commercial Real Estate, State Street Bank).
Graph 5 illustrates that the amount of space constructed has declined since the middle of
last year. This conforms with the previous graph.
Graph 5
Source: F.W. Dodge
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CHAPTER 6
THE CONSTRUCTION LENDING ENVIRONMENT
TODA Y (JUNE 1999)
6.1 Changes in Permanent Loan Originators
Ultimately, with the recess of the capital market crisis, investors and lenders became aware
of the unchanged nature of property market fundamentals. Spreads over Treasury for
permanent financing, and over LIBOR for construction lending, narrowed. Conduits
gradually returned to the market. Securitizations were, however, smaller in size in order
to warehouse less loan inventories at any moment in time and, thereby, reduce exposure to
market risk.
The pendulum has now begun to swing back to pre-capital crunch. Since September of
last year, CMBS (investment banks) originators have regained a significant portion of the
permanent financing market that they lost as direct result of the capital crunch. Graph 6
illustrates that the CMBS share of permanent loans has increased from 5% of the market
to 25% as of June 1999. This is, however, significantly less than the 55% share of the
market that they held in July 1998, prior to the crunch. This reflects the opportunistic
nature of the public capital markets. "It enters the market quickly when profitable
opportunities are present and flees at the first sign of trouble."6 1
61 Jun Han, The Next Millennium Will Be Different, Mortgage Bankers Association, February 1, 1999.
It is interesting to note that both banks and insurance companies still account for a greater
share of the market than they did in July of last year. Banks and insurance companies now
account for the remaining 75% of take-out financing. Since investors have probably
adjusted their risk assessment of CMBS in light of the capital crunch, it is expected that
the present distribution of market share will remain unchanged in the near term.
Graph 6
Source: Survey Results
6.2 Underwriting Standards
Given the relative stability of macro-economic factors and the increased availability of
take-out financing since the capital crunch, construction lenders have once again eased
underwriting standards. In the absence of global turmoil and aggressive lending practices
undertaken previously undertaken by conduits, underwriting standards have found a
"middle ground" that more accurately reflects property market fundamentals. A brief
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synopsis of the change in underwriting standards from July 1998 to June 1999 is presented
below in graphical form.
Changes in LTV Requirements
As of June 1999, the average LTV for construction loans was 75%.
Graph 7
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Changes in Equity Requirements
As of June 1999, the average equity contribution was 20 percent. This is slightly down
(5%) from the height of the capital crisis for the same reason that LTV ratios have
changed. It can be seen that the total LTV ratios and equity requirements are 95% at all
stages of the capital crisis. The remaining 5% would consist of mezzanine financing.
Graph 8
C hmngas in Squity ftequirementa
25
20
10
i 4
Jul06 0 0$-96
Spreads Over LIBOR for Construction Loans
Since the capital crunch, spreads over LIBOR for construction loans have decreased to
200 basis points, the midpoint between pre-capital and capital crunch spreads. This
reflects lenders concerns that they do not want the property market to experience the
dramatic oversupply of buildings as occurred in the early 90's.
Graph 8
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Pre Leasing Requirements for Construction Loans
Since the capital crunch, the amount of pre-leasing required has reduced to approximately
30%. This represents a 20% reduction to the pre-leasing required at the height of the
capital crunch and a 10% increase in pre-leasing requirements prior to the capital crisis.
Graph 9
Source: Survey Results
Percent of Loans with Forward Commitments
The percent of construction loans that require forward commitments has returned to pre-
capital crisis levels. As of June 1999, 10% of construction loans required forward
commitments.
Graph 10
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Percent of Lenders Issuing Forward Commitments
Graph 11 shows that all lenders are less willing to issue forward commitments. While the
percent of banks willing to issue forward commitments has remained steady since the
height of the capital crisis, all other originators (except banks) have reduced their forward
commitments. Conduits have completely dropped out of the forward commitment market.
Graph 11
Percent of Originators Issuing Forward Conmnitments
E 08
E0
0.75
0 4
L 05
0.
0 2
0
Jul-98 Sep-98 Present
E Banks g Insurance Companies C]Pension Funds 3 CMBS N RET's Opportunistic
Source: Survey Results
6.3 Property Market Fundamentals and Development Activity Today
Today, most markets in the US are still enjoying strong market fundamentals - rising
occupancies, rising rents and increasing values. After finding it difficult to finance
projects immediately after the capital crunch, developers are once-again finding the capital
they need. Any fears of a capital crisis have subsided. "The worst is over and a definitely
improving borrowing climate has quickly emerged."62 The dissipation of the fear of
overbuilding and the stability of property market fundamentals effectively overcame the
effects of the capital crunch.
The capital crunch ultimately acted as a warning signal against the relaxation of
underwriting standards in commercial lending. As a result, while financing remains
available, more emphasis has been put on the 'quality' of the development. "The good
deals that make a lot of economic sense are still going to get done." 63 Some developers
and investors are, however, finding loans on some types of deals difficult to secure. Real
estate companies attempting to finance hotel and some health-care facilities must often pay
significantly higher interest rates than deals involving office buildings or apartment
complexes. 64 This higher cost of financing reflects broader industry concerns that these
sectors are over-built. In fact, "the only good news to come out of the capital market
mess is that the turmoil immediately shut down the spigot on lending to real estate, and
the sectors that were overheating were built no more."65 According to Mr. Jacques
Gordon, Director of Investment Research at LaSalle Advisors Capital Management, "It's
all working like it's supposed to."66
62 Interview with George Fantini, Fantini & Gorge, April 1999.
63 Barbara De Lollis, Would-Be Building Boom Stifled by Credit Crunch, The Miami Herald, November
26, 1998 (quoting Lisa Hillier, real estate analyst, E & Y Kenneth Leventhal).
64 Interview with George Fantini, Fantini & Gorge, April 1999.
65 Steve Bergsman, US Forecast, National Real Estate Investor, November 1998.
66 Steve Bergsman, US Forecast, National Real Estate Investor, November 1998.
According to Lend Lease Real Estate Investments' Emerging Trends in Real Estate, the
recent curtailment of capital has transformed the real estate business. "1999 promises to
be a market environment that recent generations have never experienced - equilibrium."67
According to Donald Noland, assistant director of research for Cushmann and Wakefield,
"office vacancy rates are among the lowest in history, which suggests that we are seeing
an equilibrium that bodes well for the industry."6
The roiling of the real estate markets in 1998 may mean a significant and long-term change
going forward. Hugh Kelly, chief economist of Landauer Real Estate Counselors in New
York, predicts the next five years are going to be slower than the past five years.69
However, "property markets across the country are tight at the present time, with demand
outstripping supply."70 In such an atmosphere, funding construction projects appears to
be a viable option. According to Matthew E. Galligan, managing director of Boston based
Fleet Financial Group, "there are very few cranes up in major metropolitan areas yet. In,
fact we are at the beginning stages of the development cycle."71
According to the interview results, capital availability in 1999 will likely be reduced."
However, lenders and investors must distinguish between swings in the capital markets,
67 Emerging Trends in Real Estate 1999, Lend Lease and Price Waterhouse/Coopers.68 Mariwyn Evans, Next Stop - The Millennium, Journal of Property Management, January 1, 1999.
69 Steve Bergsman, US Forecast, National Real Estate Investor, November 1998.
70 Maria Wood, Where Has Public Money Gone?, Real Estate Forum: Annual Debt and Equity Capital
Survey, April 1999 (quoting Matthew Galligan, Managing Director of Fleet Financial Group).
7  e id.
72 Emerging Trends in Real Estate 1999, Lend Lease and Price Waterhouse/Coopers.
like CMBS volatility, and the underlying real estate fundamentals, which are really quite
good.73
Though development is underway in most sectors and markets around the country,
observers tend to be cautious rather than worried. The markets are behaving quite
differently than in the overheated eighties, when unrestrained development continued in
the face of rising vacancy and slowing demand. In fact, aggregate commercial
construction is below the average for the last 18 years, even with recently stepped up
activity. A survey conducted by Lend Lease/PriceWaterhouseCoopers indicates that real
estate professional's near term concerns center around potential exogenous shocks rather
than real estate fundamentals. "Today, what happens in Tokyo, Beijing, or Moscow is
more important to real estate that what happens on Main Street."74
73 Emerging Trends in Real Estate 1999, Lend Lease and Price Waterhouse/Coopers.
74 Id.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Many real estate market participants strongly believe that the introduction of public capital
markets will introduce greater levels of efficiency to a market that has traditionally been
very inefficient. In the long run, the public markets will improve the efficiency of the real
estate market through greater disclosure and dissemination of information. They suggest
that the presence of public capital in commercial real estate will introduce discipline, as
capital will only flow to projects supported by sound real estate market fundamentals. A
more responsive supply of capital will reduce the risk of over-building and, thereby, result
in a less extreme cycle.
This positive influence of the capital markets was clearly demonstrated by the markets
correction of REIT share prices in early 1998. In response to REIT managers paying
unprecedented prices for assets and to the potential of overbuilding in the future, the
capital markets reduced available capital and adjusted pricing to accurately reflect
potential market conditions. Through the foresight and efficiency of the capital markets,
discipline was quickly injected into the property markets.
The events surrounding the disruption in the CMBS market in August of 1998
demonstrated an entirely different phenomenon, an arguably negative affect of the capital
markets. Despite sound property market fundamentals, capital funding of commercial
development was temporarily cut-off due to global economic problems. The sudden
volatility in CMBS spreads had a severe impact on the real estate market. Underwriting
standards were tightened, demonstrating that the property market is not solely dependent
on real estate fundamentals, but on external market factors as well. As long as the
presence of public capital remains significant in the real estate market, risk premium
changes in the global market will be very disruptive to the pricing of capital necessary to
finance both public and private real estate. Accordingly, the capital markets may add
volatility to the real estate market, at least in the short run.
We acknowledge that the capital crisis came at a period when underwriting standards were
declining slightly and acted as a catalyst to bring those standards into conformity with
property market fundamentals. However, such a crisis could have occurred when both
property market fundamentals and underwriting standards were sound. In that instance,
the associated benefits of the capital markets (foresight, efficiency and discipline) would
have come at a high cost, dramatic short-term volatility.
As market professionals consistently praise the benefits of capital markets influence on
commercial real estate (which are significant), it is important to keep in mind the related
costs. The link between public capital markets and property markets will undoubtedly
increase volatility and, thereby, risk over the short-term.
As evidenced by the capital crunch of August 1998, the role of construction lenders has
become more dynamic. Henceforth, construction lenders will have to quickly adjust
underwriting standards to reflect the ever-changing risk characteristics present in the
capital markets. The question remains: Will the long-term efficiencies gain by the
presence of the public markets outweigh the short-term costs, namely increase volatility?
The answer will largely depend on the ability of construction lenders to monitor the capital
markets and price loans accordingly.
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We are currently writing a thesis on Construction Lending at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Center for Real Estate. Our thesis will focus on the capital markets impact on construction lending. It
would be greatly appreciated if you could take the time to complete the following questionnaire providing
relevant market insight.
Please fax the completed questionnaire to (617) 253-8074 by June 5, 1999. We can be
contacted at the following number if you have any questions: (617) 374-6545.
Many thanks from Steve Garuti (M.S. '99) and Ben Goodsir (M.S. '99).
Name:
Position:
Organization:
1. For each of the given time periods, approximately how many construction loans did your
organization originate?
N e oJuly 1998 September 1998 Present
Number of Loans
2. What were the typical underwriting standards that your company required at the stated times?
Underwriting Requirements July 1998 September 1998 Present
Loan to Value Ratios
Percent of pre-leasing required
Percentage with Guarantees
Percent with take-out financing
Spread over LIBOR
3. Of the loans that were originated by your company, what percentage contained mezzanine
financing?
P July 1998 September 1998 Present
Percent with Mezzanine
4. Of the total property value (properties containing mezzanine financing), on average what
percentage was mezzanine financing?
July 1998 September 1998 Present
Percent of Mezzanine
5. Of the construction loans originated by your company, which type of institution
out financing for those loans at the stated times (by percentage)? provided take-
July 1998 September 1998 Present
Banks
Insurance Companies
Pension Funds
Conduits
REITs
Opportunistic Funds
Other (please specify)
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
6. What percentage of the above companies issued forward commitments for permanent
financing at the stated times?
July 1998 September 1998 Present
Banks
Insurance Companies
Pension Funds
CMBS (Wall St)
REITs
Opportunistic Funds
Other (please specify)
7. As of August 1998 (at the height of the capital crisis) what was your opinion of underlying
property fundamentals?
8. What impact did the capital crunch of the fall of 1998 have on construction lending?
